Copy­right Notice & Dis­claimer

© Atul Patil, 2015. All rights reserved. This arti­cle, titled “Ran­dom­ize Dis­sem­i­na­tion Path for Secure Data Trans­mis­sion in Mobile Ad-Hoc Net­work”, was authored and pub­lished by Atul Patil. It was orig­i­nal­ly fea­tured in the Inter­na­tion­al Jour­nal of Inno­v­a­tive Research in Com­put­er Sci­ence & Tech­nol­o­gy (IJIRCST), ISSN: 2347–5552, Vol­ume 3, Issue 2, March 2015. The orig­i­nal pub­li­ca­tion can be accessed at https://www.ijircst.org/DOC/29_irp287e8bd14ac-6c92-4faf-b6ba-8086500cccf7.pdf.

Dis­claimer: This arti­cle is repub­lished here by the orig­i­nal author, Atul Patil, in accor­dance with the copy­right poli­cies of the Inter­na­tion­al Jour­nal of Inno­v­a­tive Research in Com­put­er Sci­ence & Tech­nol­o­gy (IJIRCST). The con­tent remains unchanged to main­tain its orig­i­nal­i­ty. For any addi­tion­al inquiries or copy­right-relat­ed ques­tions, please con­tact the author direct­ly.

Abstract—

Mobile ad hoc net­work (MANET) is an autonomous sys­tem of mobile nodes. The nodes are free to move arbi­trar­i­ly. Due to lack of a cen­tral­ized secure infra­struc­ture, the com­mu­ni­ca­tion is prone to secu­ri­ty attacks and the nodes can be eas­i­ly com­pro­mised. Secu­ri­ty has become one of the major issues for data com­mu­ni­ca­tion over wired and wire­less  net­works  so  var­i­ous secu­ri­ty-enhanced mea­sures have been pro­posed to improve the secu­ri­ty of data trans­mis­sion over pub­lic net­works. The objec­tive of pro­posed work is to improve rout­ing secu­ri­ty we pro­pose a proac­tive mech­a­nism as Ran­dom­ized rout­ing that explores the exis­tence of mul­ti­ple routes and forces pack­ets to take alter­nate paths ran­dom­ly from its neigh­bors that is a Ran­dom­ize  deliv­ery path for secure data trans­mis­sion. We main­tain neigh­bor­ing nodes of each node by send­ing hel­lo pack­ets. Then we find out deliv­ery path from neigh­bor­ing nodes by ran­dom oper­a­tion exclud­ing pre­vi­ous hop which is main­tained as his­to­ry node. Pro­to­col RDSDV is imple­ment­ed to ran­dom­ize deliv­ery paths and com­pared the proac­tive rout­ing pro­to­cols DSDV and RDSDV for dif­fer­ent num­ber of nodes. The per­for­mance of these pro­to­cols is mea­sured under a Par­tic­u­lar sce­nario on the basis of three met­rics as Pack­et deliv­ery ratio, e2e delay and jit­ter.

Index Terms:  JITTER, MANET, PDR, R‑DSDV, NS2, XGraph

I.    Introduction

A Mobile Ad-hoc Net­work (MANET) is a col­lec­tion of wire­less nodes that can dynam­i­cal­ly be set up any­where and any­time with­out using any pre- exist­ing net­work infra­struc­ture. It is an autonomous sys­tem in which mobile hosts con­nect­ed by wire­less links are free to move ran­dom­ly and often act as routers at the same time. The topol­o­gy of such net­works is like­ly high­ly dynam­ic because each net­work node can freely move and no pre-installed base sta­tions exist. Due to the lim­it­ed wire­less trans­mis­sion range of each node, data pack­ets then may be for­ward­ed along mul­ti hops.

Secu­ri­ty prob­lems in MANET in term of authen­ti­ca­tion have been stud­ied exten­sive­ly in over two decades. First the thresh­old cryp­tog­ra­phy proved to be an effec­tive scheme for key man­age­ment and dis­tri­b­u­tion. How­ev­er it adds over­head to rout­ing and increas­es traf­fic in the net­work. The attacks such as worm­hole and Denial of Ser­vice (DoS) [9] can com­pro­mise routes through spoof­ing ARP or IP pack­ets, pas­sive­ly or active­ly. Due to band­width con­straints and ener­gy con­ser­va­tion, an effi­cient imple­men­ta­tion of the scheme is crit­i­cal. Exist­ing work on secu­ri­ty-enhanced data trans­mis­sion [3] includes the designs of cryp­tog­ra­phy algo­rithms and sys­tem infra­struc­tures and secu­ri­ty- enhanced rout­ing meth­ods. Their com­mon objec­tives are often to defeat var­i­ous threats over the Inter­net, includ­ing eaves­drop­ping, spoof­ing, ses­sion hijack­ing, etc.

Among many well-known designs for cryp­tog­ra­phy based sys­tems, the IP Secu­ri­ty (IPSec) and the Secure Sock­et Lay­er are pop­u­lar­ly sup­port­ed and imple­ment­ed in many sys­tems and plat­forms. Although IPSec and SSL do great­ly improve the secu­ri­ty lev­el for data trans­mis­sion, but they intro­duce sub­stan­tial over­heads which is unavoid­able. Espe­cial­ly on gateway/host per­for­mance and effec­tive net­work band­width. For exam­ple, the data trans­mis­sion over­head is 5 cycles/byte over an Intel Pen­tium II with the Lin­ux IP stack alone, and the over­head increas­es to 58cycles/byte when Advanced Encryp­tion Stan­dard (AES) is adopt­ed for encryption/decryption. Dif­fer­ent from the past work on the designs of cryp­tog­ra­phy algo­rithms and sys­tem infra­struc­tures, we designed a Ran­dom­ize deliv­ery paths algo­rithm for data trans­mis­sion in mobile ad hoc net­work..

Ran­dom­ize Dis­sem­i­na­tion Path for Secure Data Trans­mis­sion in Mobile Ad-Hoc Net­work

II.  SECURITY ISSUES

The secu­ri­ty of com­mu­ni­ca­tion in ad hoc wire­less net­works is impor­tant, espe­cial­ly in mil­i­tary appli­ca­tions. The absence of any cen­tral coor­di­na­tion mech­a­nism and shared wire­less medi­um makes MANETs more vul­ner­a­ble to dig­i­tal/­cy­ber-attacks than wired net­works. These attacks are gen­er­al­ly clas­si­fied into two types: pas­sive and active attacks. Pas­sive attacks do not influ­ence the func­tion­al­i­ty of a con­nec­tion. An adver­sary aims to inter­fere in a net­work and read the trans­mit­ted infor­ma­tion with­out chang­ing it. If it is also pos­si­ble for the adver­sary to inter­pret the cap­tured data, the require­ment of con­fi­den­tial­i­ty is vio­lat­ed. It’s dif­fi­cult to rec­og­nize pas­sive attacks because under such attacks the net­work oper­ates nor­mal­ly. In gen­er­al, encryp­tion is used to com­bat such attacks.

Active attacks aim to change or destroy the data of a trans­mis­sion or attempt to influ­ence the nor­mal func­tion­ing of the net­work. Active attacks when per­formed from for­eign net­works are referred to as exter­nal attacks. If nodes from with­in the ad-hoc net­work are involved, the attacks are referred to as inter­nal attacks. This pro­to­col is imple­ment­ed to com­bat pas­sive and active attacks.

III.     Scope of security

Secu­ri­ty in mobile ad hoc net­works is very impor­tant because of the vul­ner­a­bil­i­ty of wire­less links, the lim­it­ed phys­i­cal pro­tec­tion of nodes, the dynam­i­cal­ly chang­ing topol­o­gy, the absence of cer­ti­fi­ca­tion author­i­ty, and the lack of a cen­tral­ized mon­i­tor­ing or man­age­ment point. To pro­tect infor­ma­tion and resources from attacks and mis­be­hav­ior. The require­ments that effec­tive secu­ri­ty archi­tec­ture must ensure Avail­abil­i­ty, Authen­ti­ca­tion, Data con­fi­den­tial­i­ty, Integri­ty & non rejec­tion.

Sys­tems that ensure avail­abil­i­ty in MANETs seek to com­bat denial of ser­vice and ener­gy star­va­tion attacks, as well as node mis­be­hav­ior such as node self­ish­ness in pack­et for­ward­ing. The core func­tion­al­i­ties pro­vid­ed are rout­ing and pack­et for­ward­ing, and are close­ly relat­ed. The data For­ward­ing ser­vice con­sists of cor­rect­ly relay­ing the received pack­ets from node to node until they reach their final des­ti­na­tion, the routes select­ed and main­tained by the rout­ing pro­to­col.

These fea­tures can be exploit­ed by mali­cious nodes to eaves­drop­ping pack­ets in tran­sit, and then ana­lyze them to obtain con­fi­den­tial and sen­si­tive infor­ma­tion. The pre­ven­tive solu­tion to pro­tect infor­ma­tion is to encrypt pack­ets, but data encryp­tion does not pre­vent mali­cious nodes from eaves­drop­ping and try­ing to break decryp­tion keys. Since pack­ets fol­low mul­ti-hop routes and pass through mobile nodes, a mali­cious node can par­tic­i­pate in rout­ing, include itself in routes, and drop all pack­ets it gets to for­ward. Mali­cious attacks or self­ish mis­be­hav­ior on either of them will dis­rupt the nor­mal net­work oper­a­tions.

This pro­to­col is designed main­ly to over­come secu­ri­ty attacks such as DoS, resource con­sump­tion attack and drop­ping data pack­ets attack caused by mali­cious nodes. In Pro­posed algo­rithm, for data deliv­ery of a pack­et with the des­ti­na­tion at a node, to min­i­mize the prob­a­bil­i­ty that pack­ets are eaves­dropped over a spe­cif­ic link, a ran­dom­iza­tion process for pack­et deliv­er­ies. In this process, the pre­vi­ous next-hop for the source node s is iden­ti­fied in the first step of the process. Then, the process ran­dom­ly picks up a neigh­bor­ing node as the next hop for the cur­rent pack­et trans­mis­sion. The exclu­sion for the next hop selec­tion avoids trans­mit­ting two con­sec­u­tive pack­ets in the same link, and the ran­dom­ized pick­up pre­vents attack­ers from eas­i­ly pre­dict­ing rout­ing paths for the com­ing trans­mit­ted pack­ets.

IV.     Randomized-dsdv

A Des­ti­na­tion-Sequenced Dis­tance Vec­tor (DSDV) rout­ing pro­to­col is a typ­i­cal rout­ing pro­to­col for MANETs, which is based on the Dis­trib­uted Bell­man-Ford algo­rithm [3]. In DSDV, each route is tagged with a sequence num­ber which is orig­i­nat­ed by des­ti­na­tion, indi­cat­ing how old the route is [2]. All nodes try to find all paths to pos­si­ble des­ti­na­tions nodes in a net­work and the num­ber of hops to each des­ti­na­tion and save them in their rout­ing tables. New route broad­casts con­tain the address of des­ti­na­tion, the num­ber of hops to reach the des­ti­na­tion, the sequence num­ber of the infor­ma­tion receive regard­ing the des­ti­na­tion, as well as a new unique sequence num­ber for the new route broad­cast [2].

The deliv­ery of a pack­et with the des­ti­na­tion at a node. In order to min­i­mize the prob­a­bil­i­ty that pack­ets are eaves­dropped over a spe­cif­ic link, a ran­dom­iza­tion process for pack­et deliv­er­ies, in this process, the pre­vi­ous next-hop for the source node is iden­ti­fied in the first step of the process. Then, the process ran­dom­ly picks up a neigh­bor­ing node as the next hop for the cur­rent pack­et trans­mis­sion. The exclu­sion for the next hop selec­tion avoids trans­mit­ting two con­sec­u­tive pack­ets in the same link, and the ran­dom­ized pick­up pre­vents attack­ers from eas­i­ly pre­dict­ing rout­ing paths for the com­ing trans­mit­ted pack­ets.

V.  IMPLEMENTATION

This pro­to­col is imple­ment­ed using net­work sim­u­la­tor 2 tool. NS2 is a dis­crete event sim­u­la­tor tar­get­ed at net­work­ing research and is wide­ly uti­lized among aca­d­e­m­ic researchers. It is an object ori­ent­ed open source sim­u­la­tor writ­ten in OTcl and C++ [1] [2] NS2 pro­vides sub­stan­tial sup­port for sim­u­la­tions of TCP, UDP, IP rout­ing, and mul­ti­cast pro­to­cols over wired and wire­less net­works, and it is sup­port­ed by sev­er­al research orga­ni­za­tions. It helps to debug prob­lems in a con­trolled envi­ron­ment. NS2 also helps in per­form­ing Analy­sis of hypo­thet­i­cal changes. Because it is open source, new func­tions and new algo­rithms can be added by mod­i­fy­ing the source files. We imple­ment­ed the new rout­ing pro­to­col as R‑DSDV by mod­i­fy­ing codes from DSDV source code

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in NS2. This is imple­ment­ed part­ly in OTcl and part­ly in C++. We designed RDSDV_PACKET as a new pack­et struc­ture to find out neigh­bor­ing nodes. The neigh­bor­ing nodes are main­tained with rout­ing table at each node. Pack­et for­ward­ing is done by select­ing a ran­dom node from neigh­bor­ing list exclud­ing pre­vi­ous node which deliv­ered a pack­et. This pro­to­col is test­ed on sim­u­la­tion of dif­fer­ent topolo­gies with dif­fer­ent num­bers of nodes. The results are obtained from trace files by writ­ing awk script for dif­fer­ent per­for­mance met­rics. These results are obtained for DSDV and R‑DSDV pro­to­cols and plot­ted Graphs by xgraph tool. Fol­low­ing table shows net­work sim­u­la­tion para­me­ters which are con­fig­ured in tcl script as net­work inter­face, queue type and sim­u­la­tion area and oth­ers.

Table 6.1 Net­work Sim­u­la­tion Para­me­ter

Para­me­ters	Val­ues
Net­work interface/channel type	Wire­less
Radio-prop­a­ga­tion mod­el	TwoRay­Ground
Net­work inter­face type	Phy/WirelessPhy
pack­et size	512bytes
Inter­face queue type	Queue/DropTail/PriQueue
Max pack­et in IFQ	50
Num­ber of mobile Nodes	50
Sim­u­la­tion area size	1000*1000
Sim­u­la­tion dura­tion	150 sec­ond
Trans­mis­sion range	250 m
Mobil­i­ty mod­el	Ran­dom
Rout­ing pro­to­cols	RDSDV ‚DSDV

• PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

To com­pare the per­for­mance of the two pro­to­cols under dif­fer­ent sce­nario. In com­par­ing the two pro­to­cols, the eval­u­a­tion could be done in the fol­low­ing three met­rics:

A.   Packet Delivery Ratio:

The ratio of the num­ber of deliv­ered data pack­et to the des­ti­na­tion. This illus­trates the lev­el of deliv­ered data to the des­ti­na­tion. PDR =∑ Num­ber of pack­et receive / ∑ Num­ber of pack­et send. The greater val­ue of pack­et deliv­ery ratio means the bet­ter per­for­mance of the pro­to­col.

B.   End to End Delay:

The aver­age time tak­en by a data pack­et to arrive in the des­ti­na­tion. It also includes the delay caused by route dis­cov­ery process and the queue in data pack­et trans­mis­sion. Only the data pack­ets that suc­cess­ful­ly deliv­ered to des­ti­na­tions that count­ed. End to End Delay

= ∑ (arrive time – send time) / ∑ Num­ber of nodes.

C.   Jitter:

It is an impor­tant para­me­ter for eval­u­at­ing the per­for­mance of this pro­to­col. Here it means the time dif­fer­ence between deliv­er­ies of two con­sec­u­tive pack­ets to the des­ti­na­tion. Our aim is two ran­dom­ize the deliv­ery paths, so every pack­et takes dif­fer­ent path to reach des­ti­na­tion.

aver­age jit­ter= ∑ [((recvtime(j)-sendtime(j))- (recvtime(i)-sendtime(i)))/(j‑i)]/ num­ber of nodes

Because of path vari­a­tion, jit­ter val­ue is larg­er for this pro­to­col as com­pared DSDV pro­to­col and as increas­es as num­ber of nodes increas­es. We find out exper­i­men­tal results on above per­for­mance met­ric in fol­low­ing sce­nario as we con­sid­er node mobil­i­ty speed30 m/s and size 1000 X 1000 m. Topol­o­gy Size Width: 1000 Height: 1000.

Table 2. Jit­ter val­ue vari­a­tion

Nodes	Jit­ter of DSDV	Jit­ter of RDSDV
30	0.002867	0.002997
50	0.002820	0.003928
70	0.002720	0.004069
90	0.003141	0.003969
110	0.003462	0.0168

Table 2 show that, the jit­ter val­ue is greater for ran­dom­ized DSDV pro­to­col as com­pared to DSDV pro­to­col for topolo­gies with dif­fer­ent num­ber of nodes.

Fig.1: Jit­ter Vari­a­tion

Fig­ure 1 shows that , Jit­ter val­ue is less in case of DSDV pro­to­col because it uses short­est path rout­ing algo­rithm so prob­a­bil­i­ty of deliv­ery path fol­low­ing by two con­sec­u­tive pack­ets are same. So aver­age jit­ter val­ues is less as com­pared to our RDSDV(Randomized DSDV) pro­to­col.

In case of RDSDV pro­to­col, each pack­et is deliv­ered on dif­fer­ent path so time required for pack­et deliv­ery is dif­fer­ent which results jit­ter val­ue for RDSDV is greater than DSDV pro­to­col.

Table 2. PDR & EEDELAY val­ue vari­a­tion

PDR & END TO END DELAY VARIATION
Nodes	PDR (%)		End to End Delay
	DSDV	R‑DSDV	DSDV	R‑DSDV
30	98.82	99.39	135.63	126.81
50	99.47	98.17	139.88	136.11
70	99.91	99.91	142.16	139.33
90	97.10	96.12	159.18	166.54
110	91.90	88.84	208.52	211.68

Randomize Dissemination Path for Secure Data Transmission in Mobile Ad-Hoc Network

Table 2 shows that, the PDR val­ue & End to End Delay val­ues are near about same for Ran­dom­ized DSDV pro­to­col as com­pared to DSDV pro­to­col for topolo­gies with dif­fer­ent num­ber of nodes.

des­ti­na­tion. The PDR and End to End Delay met­rics of R‑DSDV pro­to­col are clos­er to the met­rics for DSDV pro­to­col under same topol­o­gy. We con­clude that secu­ri­ty attacks can be avoid­ed by this process with­out reduc­ing per­for­mance.

Fig 2: PDR vari­a­tion

Fig.3: Aver­age end to end delay vari­a­tion

From table 2 we plot­ted graph to com­pare the per­for­mance of DSDV & R‑DSDV pro­to­col. Fig­ure 2 & 3 shows that, PDR (Pack­et Deliv­ery Ratio) val­ue and End to End Delay val­ues are very close for DSDV pro­to­col and R‑DSDV pro­to­col.

This shows that over­all per­for­mance in terms of pack­et deliv­ery ratio is bet­ter than DSDV pro­to­col and aver­age end to end delay is almost same for nodes below 90.for node num­ber above 90, it is bet­ter than DSDV pro­to­col.

VII CONCLUSION

To pro­tect infor­ma­tion and resources from active, pas­sive attacks and mis­be­hav­ior. We imple­ment­ed ran­dom­ized deliv­ery path pro­to­col. In order to min­i­mize the prob­a­bil­i­ty that pack­ets are eaves­dropped over a spe­cif­ic link, we imple­ment­ed a ran­dom­iza­tion process for pack­et deliv­er­ies. In this process, ran­dom­ly picks up a neigh­bor­ing node as the next hop for the cur­rent pack­et trans­mis­sion. The exclu­sion for the next hop selec­tion avoids trans­mit­ting two con­sec­u­tive pack­ets in the same link, and the ran­dom­ized pick­up pre­vents attack­ers from eas­i­ly pre­dict­ing rout­ing paths for the com­ing trans­mit­ted pack­ets.

Exper­i­men­tal results shows that jit­ter val­ue is greater and increas­es as num­ber of nodes increas­es hence prove that each pack­et trans­mit­ted at dif­fer­ent path to

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